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HOW DO WE REDUCE CRIME AND
PRESERVE HUMAN DECENCY?
THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP IN POLICING
FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
Benjamin B. Tucker*
INTRODUCTION
The issue of crime reduction and prevention has been on the so-
cial, political, and economic agenda of modern America for more
than a century.1 During the final quarter of the twentieth century,
a new cadre of well-educated and forward-thinking police leaders
implemented innovative approaches to crime and other problems
affecting the quality of life in communities across the country and
sparked a revolution of sorts in policing strategy. We enter the
new millennium having witnessed record and sustained reductions
in serious crime and significant progress toward reinventing our
police departments through a ground swell of innovation in polic-
ing centered on community-policing theories.
True progress, however, is in the eye of the beholder. Many in
minority communities would question just how far we have come.
During the last decade, this country experienced startling and dis-
turbing displays of police brutality and corruption.2 These inci-
dents of misconduct have prompted vigorous inquiry into policing
* Benjamin B. Tucker is an Associate Professor at Pace University. Previously,
he was the Deputy Director of Operations, U.S Department of Justice, Office of
Community Oriented Policing Services, Chief of Operations in the Office of the Man-
hattan Borough President, First Deputy Commissioner/Executive Director of the
New York City Human Rights Commission, and Assistant Director of the New York
City Police Department Civilian Complaint Review Board. He was also the Director
of Field Operations at the Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia
University, and a New York City police officer. The author received his B.S. degree
from the John Jay College of Criminal Justice and his J.D. from Fordham University
School of Law.
1. For example, Theodore Roosevelt, faced with slums, a rising crime rate, and a
corrupt police force, "brought a reforming zeal to the New York City Police Commis-
sion in 1895 and set the standard for the modern NYPD." POLICE DEP'T OF THE CITY
OF N.Y., WHO WE ARE, at http://ci.nyc.ny.us/html/whoweare.html.
2. Consider, for example, the cases of Abner Louima, Amadou Diallo, and Pat-
rick Dorismond. E.g., Editorial, New York's Police Commissioner, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
10, 2000, at A20 (discussing how the police torture of Abner Louima and the shoot-
ings of two unarmed black men, Amadou Diallo and Patrick Dorismond, "raised
questions about training, reporting of violations and the expansion of independent
street crime units ... ").
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practices across the United States. The United States Commission
on Civil Rights has investigated whether the New York City Police
Department is engaging in "a pattern or practice of conduct...
that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States."3 Ac-
cording to some commentators:
Unquestionably, policing in the United States is under extensive
criticism today. Its credibility is under major attack and nearly
every month another incident involving excessive force or cor-
ruption receives national coverage. The excessive force incidents
have been particularly damaging to the image and reputation of
law enforcement in this free and democratic society.4
Allegations of racial profiling, perjury by police officials, and
other patterns and practices suggestive of police misconduct reveal
the grim reality that our society remains in crisis with respect to
police-community relations. All of this threatens to undermine the
"progressive changes that have taken place ... dealing with [the]
structure and function [of police organizations,] ... technological
advances, and those involved with the recent emphasis on integrity
and ethics."5 Indeed, strained relations between the police and mi-
nority communities have historically been among the most well-
documented and difficult urban problems to solve. The problem
has been especially acute in the relationship between the police
and the African American community, and more recently has man-
ifested itself in similar ways between the police and the Hispanic
community.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2000). The United States Commission on Civil Rights, orig-
inally created under the Civil Rights Act of 1957, is an independent, bipartisan fact-
finding agency of the Executive Branch. For information on the Commission, see
http://www.usccr.gov/index.html. The Civil Rights Act of 1983 established a new Com-
mission. Id. In August 2000, the Commission released a report entitled Police Prac-
tices and Civil Rights in New York City based on a May 26, 1999 hearing on the impact
of police practices on civil rights in the community. Letter from Mary Frances Berry,
Chairperson, Unites States Commission on Civil Rights, to The President, The Presi-
dent of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, http://www.
usccr.gov/nypolprc/tran.htm. The Commission expressed "a strong interest in studying
the methods used by the city to balance crime fighting with the exercise of appropri-
ate restraint, particularly following the highly publicized tragedies involving Abner
Louima and Amadou Diallo." Id. For a response by the New York City Police De-
partment, see N. Y.P.D. Response to the Draft Report of the United States Commission
on Civil Rights-Police Practices and Civil Rights in New York City, available at http://
www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/nypd/pdf/dclm/execsumm.pdf.
4. CLEMENS BARTOLLAS & LARRY D. HAHN, POLICING IN AMERICA 341 (1999).
5. Id.
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Significant data exist regarding citizens' attitudes toward police.
Although the findings have been consistent, they have not been
favorable. Analyzing public opinion polls conducted since the
1960s, Tuch and Weitzer found that well publicized incidents of po-
lice brutality temporarily lead to lessened support for police on
both a local and national level.6 Although both blacks' and whites'
views are affected, blacks' support of the police is more likely to
erode; and "well publicized brutality incidents have greater longev-
ity for blacks and Latinos than for whites."' 7 Others have shown
that significant differences exist in the attitudes toward the police
of various racial and ethnic groups. For example, Samuel Walker,
analyzing Bureau of Justice statistics, notes that while 22% of Afri-
can Americans had "very little or no confidence in the police,"
only 9% of whites agreed.8 Polls focusing on Hispanics as a distinct
group have determined that their views "fall somewhere between
those of whites and African Americans."9 In September 2000, a
survey of city residents, commissioned by the New York City
Council, offered further insight into "the city's paradoxical rela-
tionship with its police force . ,x"10 The poll revealed:
[T]hat residents unequivocally appreciate the department's role
in rolling back crime but are suspicious of its tactics, its attitudes
and its commitment to disciplining brutal or corrupt officers.
The poll also found that the department had significantly greater
support from white residents than from blacks or Hispanics,
many of whom reported being afraid or concerned when ap-
proached by the police."
By almost any measure, people of color feel a lack of trust in and
respect for, as well as a high level of fear of, the police. One need
only recall the string of high-profile cases involving police en-
counters with blacks and Hispanics resulting in death or serious
injury to the citizens.'" These incidents eroded the general public's
confidence in the police, while specifically raising the level of ten-
sion in police-minority community contacts. At the same time, the
6. Steven A. Tuch & Ronald Weitzer, Racial Differences in Attitudes Toward the
Police, 61 PUB. OPINION Q. 642, 647-48 (1997).
7. Id.
8. SAMUEL WALKER, THE POLICE IN AMERICA: AN INTRODUCTION 215 (3d ed.
1999) (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 1995, at 133 (1996)).
9. Id.
10. C. J. Chivers, Approval and Wariness in Poll on Police, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15,
2000, at B9.
11. Id.
12. See supra note 2.
604 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII
police feel that they are often under-appreciated by the community
and that any public scrutiny of their actions is undeserved. These
conditions do not bode well for the future of police-community re-
lations in our country.
However, without greatly improved police-community relations,
the significant reductions in crime we have achieved, especially
those gains driven by community-policing strategies, will not be
sustained. Continuing to institutionalize police department re-
forms and successful policing strategies, and strengthening police-
community relations, will require innovative and sustained police
and political leadership.
WHAT HISTORY HAS TAUGHT US
Little more than thirty years have passed since I joined the ranks
of the New York City Police Department. The Knapp Commission
was about to begin its investigation into police corruption, sparked
by allegations made by police officer Frank Serpico, who broke the
"blue wall of silence. ' ' 13 Crime was on the rise and would reach
record highs before finally leveling off almost twenty years later.
It was November 1969, and a year before, the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 196814 was passed by Congress to
address the rise in crime. Among its formidable contributions, the
Act established the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
("LEAA"). LEAA was charged with implementing a comprehen-
sive program of aid to state and local criminal justice agencies, with
a particular emphasis on street crime and riot control. In 1973, a
report published by the American Bar Association, Standards Re-
lating to the Urban Police Function, offered further insights into the
complex role of police in our society.15 It noted "that police of-
ficers were primarily peacekeepers rather than crime fighters: They
spent most of their time maintaining order rather than fighting
crime."' 6 From that point forward, the face of policing in our ur-
ban centers, and to a lesser extent in other areas of the country,
would change forever.
13. WHITMAN KNAPP, KNAPP COMMISSION REPORT ON POLICE CORRUPTION
(1972).
14. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified in scattered section of 18 U.S.C. and
42 U.S.C.).
15. WALKER, supra note 8, at 35-36 (citing AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO THE URBAN POLICE FUNCTION (2d ed. 1980)).
16. Id.
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This transformation was driven by recommendations from ap-
pointed bodies such as the President's Commission on Law En-
forcement and Administration of Justice, and its report, The
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, 7 as well as the National Ad-
visory Commission on Civil Disorders, and its "Kerner Commis-
sion" report 8 and the National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention of Violence.' 9 These reports highlighted problems with
the way police departments were run and the manner in which they
carried out policing functions. The reports noted, among other
things, that the police had "[p]aid too little attention to effective
organization[; g]iven inadequate attention to community issues and
concerns[; n]ot seriously considered preventive or less coercive
strategies to deal with civil disorder and[; n]ot explored alternative
strategies to deal with violence."2 Moreover, they suggested that
police needed to affect changes in "[t]he quality of police person-
nel[; t]he quality of officer preparation and training[; t]he manage-
ment structure within law enforcement agencies[; h]ow the police
relate to the community[; h]ow the police deliver services to the
community and[; h]ow the police define their responsibilities."'2 1
In response to these criticisms, some police administrators and
managers began to look for solutions to problems and answers to
questions that now challenged their traditional policing practices.
Motivated to meet the challenge and further driven by the anti-
crime initiatives of the Johnson, Nixon, and Ford administrations-
and supported by significant federal funding from LEAA-police
17. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967).
18. NAT'L. ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDER, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968). The Commission is popularly
known as the "Kerner Commission," named after its Chair, Governor Otto Kerner.
19. DAVID L. CARTER & LOUIS RADELET, THE POLICE AND THE COMMUNITY 55
(6th ed. 1999) (citing NAT'L COMM'N ON CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE,
LAW AND ORDER RECONSIDERED 292 (1969) [hereinafter CARTER & RADELET],
[There] is an evident inability of the police, as presently organized, manned
[sic] financed, equipped, and led, to meet effectively any of the demands and
expectations placed on them by the public. These inadequacies are evi-
denced in their inability to prevent a crime; their declining record in solving
crimes known to them; their sluggish response to and indifferent investiga-
tion of all but major crimes or those involving important persons, businesses
or institutions. Particularly evident is the inability to deal effectively with
crime in minority-populated ghettos for reasons, which involve [considering]
minority group attitudes and non-cooperation as important as police atti-
tudes, facilities, and efficiency.
Id.
20. CARTER & RADELET, supra note 19, at 55.
21. Id. at 55.
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leaders began to implement changes. Thus, in the 1970s and 1980s,
police departments in a number of large2 2 and small cities2 3 began
to experiment with new ways of providing police services and fight-
ing crime.
Research flourished and played a critical role in helping law en-
forcement officers test traditional assumptions about police opera-
tions, organization, management, and deployment. Findings from
key studies including the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment
(1974),24 the Kansas City Response Time Experiment (1976),25 the
Newark Foot Patrol Experiment,26 and the Newport News Problem-
Oriented Policing studies in the 1980s27 were all extremely useful to
law enforcement officials.
But perhaps the most important driving force behind effective
change and the improvement of management, administration, and
operations in policing has been the leadership of more progressive
police administrators who understood the importance and value of
exploring new crime-prevention and crime-fighting strategies. In
addition to funding provided by the federal government, these po-
lice chiefs and command staff received financial support for these
reform efforts from such professional organizations as the Police
22. Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 621, 637 (1996) (noting that what people call "big city" police departments typi-
cally serve 100,000 people or more).
23. Lewis D. Solomon, Local Currency: A Legal And Policy Analysis, 5 KAN. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 59, 71 (1996) ("[S]mall cities (in the range of 50,000 - 100,000) typically
outperform larger ones in a number of social variables, including crime, health,
mental illness, recreation, education, and higher participation in cultural matters.").
24. CARTER & RADELET, supra note 19, at 87 (citing GEORGE L KELLING ET AL.,
THE KANSAS CITY PREVENTIVE EXPERIMENT: TECHNICAL REPORT (1974)).
25. CARTER & RADELET, supra note 19, at 87 (citing KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI
POLICE DEP'T., RESPONSE TIME ANALYSIS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1977)).
26. CARTER & RADALET, supra note 19, at 88 (citing GEORGE L. KELLING, PO-
LICE FOUNDATION, THE NEWARK FOOT PATROL EXPERIMENT (1981)).
27. CARTER & RADALET, supra note 19, at 88 (citing JOHN ECK & WILLIAM SPEL-
MAN ET AL., PROBLEM SOLVING: PROBLEM ORIENTED POLICING IN NEWPORT NEWS
(1987)).
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Foundation,28 the Police Executive Research Forum,29 and the In-
ternational Association of Chiefs of Police.3°
The "reform period" in policing,3' which began in the 1930s, had
clearly stagnated as we entered the 1970s. However, the 1970s
marked a rebirth of reform and a transition to a more community-
based mode of operation. Many felt significant excitement and
high expectations about the future of policing because of this
transition.
CHANGE FOR THE BETrER
Over the next thirty years, law enforcement would undergo great
progress and development on several levels within the policing pro-
fession. The composition and practices of police departments
would begin to change.
A. Racial Diversity of Police Departments Increases
Civil rights advocates, who had long expressed concern over the
limited representation of minorities in urban police departments,
would witness positive shifts in the racial composition of police de-
partments. By 1993, the majority of officers in Detroit, Washing-
ton, D.C., and Atlanta were African American.32 By the same time
28. The Police Foundation was established in 1970 with assistance from the Ford
Foundation. From 1970 through 1990, the Police Foundation sponsored what would be
some of the most significant police research in the history of policing in this country.
E.g., CMTY. POLICING CONSORTIUM, ABOUT THE CONSORTIUM, at http://www.com-
munitypolicing.org/aboutl.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2000).
29. The Police Executive Research Forum ("PERF") is a national organization of
police executives representing larger jurisdictions. Its mission is to improve the pro-
fessional quality of police services through the use of research and development.
PERF is based in Washington, D.C. Id.
30. The International Association of Chiefs of Police is a professional organization
of top law enforcement executives from the United States and abroad. It facilitates
"the exchange of information among police administrators [and promotes] the highest
standards of performance and conduct within the police profession." Id.
31. The "reform period" refers to the period in American policing which marked
the efforts of police administrators to move away from police corruption towards the
professionalization of policing. It was prompted by the findings and recommendations
of the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, also known as the
Wickersham Commission. REPORT OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE &
ENFORCEMENT RELATIVE TO THE FACTS AS TO THE ENFORCEMENT, THE BENEFITS,
AND THE ABUSES UNDER THE PROHIBITION LAWS, BOTH BEFORE AND SINCE THE
ADOPTION OF THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION, ENFORCEMENT
OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc No. 722 (3d Sess. 1931)
(discussing the abuses arising from the enforcement of Prohibition laws). Police ad-
ministrators placed strong emphasis on training and focused on making the police
more efficient in their crime fighting efforts.
32. WALKER, supra note 8, at 37.
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in Miami, 47.7% of the police force was Hispanic, while African
Americans constituted 17.4% of that force.33 Furthermore, Afri-
can Americans moved into important leadership roles as police
chiefs in cities such as New York City, Los Angeles, Atlanta, Chi-
cago, and Houston. 34
B. Women Rise Through the Ranks
Women, who were historically underrepresented in policing, in-
creased their numbers in police departments due to the passage of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibited employment discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex.35 Today, women represent about 13% of
police officers in big city departments.36 Female officers are now
assigned the same duties as male officers, including routine patrol
duties. Additionally, departments have tried to eliminate many of
the barriers to recruiting women, 37 and as a result, women have
risen to the highest levels of policing. For example, a former stu-
dent of mine, a recruit in the New York City Police Academy class
of 1979, is now an assistant chief and former patrol borough com-
mander in the Bronx. I like to think that, in some small way, she
and her fellow recruits were influenced during their careers by my
insistence that the police officer's role is not simply to enforce the
letter of the law, but to temper application of the law with common
sense, respect, and consideration for the people he or she serves.
C. Training Improves
Police training has advanced, with entry-level training growing
from 300 hours in the 1960s to more than 1000 hours in many de-
partments by the 1990s. 3s At the same time, many departments
have instituted field training as an adjunct to their traditional acad-
emy training, offering practical, hands-on guidance by experienced
officers to new recruits.39
Of critical importance, new policies and procedures were insti-
tuted to check police behavior on the street. Police departments
developed standard operating procedures to shape and control the
exercise of police discretion. This policy shift was prompted by an
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 20003-2(a) (1999) (enacted July 2, 1964).
36. WALKER, supra note 8, at 37 (citing SUSAN E. MARTIN, THE POLICE FOUND.,
WOMEN ON THE MOVE: THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN POLICING (1990)).
37. WALKER, supra note 8, at 37.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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increase in lawsuits and driven significantly by Supreme Court de-
cisions on such police practices as search and seizure 40 and interro-
gations,41 but also by protests from the minority community
concerning police misconduct, particularly the use of deadly
force.42 For example, an innovative policy instituted in 1972 by the
New York City Police Department reduced firearms discharges by
officers by 30%, a significant decrease in the use of deadly force.43
Over the next decade, as police departments in other cities adopted
similar policies, the national rate of citizens shot and killed by po-
lice decreased by 50%. 44
D. Overcoming Institutional Resistance to Change
However, police unions made strides as well, and "by the 1970s
* . . had established themselves as a powerful force in American
policing. ' 45 Many officers felt "angry and alienated over Supreme
Court rulings, criticisms by civil rights groups, poor salaries and
benefits, and arbitrary disciplinary practices by police chiefs."
46
Unions secured salary and benefits increases for officers and won
grievance procedures to protect officers' rights during disciplinary
40. E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry confirmed that courts must guard
against harassing behavior that violates Fourth Amendment protections against un-
reasonable search and seizure, and that, whenever practical, police must obtain prior
judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure. Id. at 15-21.
However, Terry also permits police, when using proper procedure, to conduct limited
searches of suspects' outer clothing as a means of discovering if the suspect has weap-
ons that might be used to assault the officer. Id. at 27, 30.
41. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that statements ob-
tained from defendants during incommunicado interrogation in police-dominated at-
mosphere, without full warning of constitutional rights, were presumptively
compelled and therefore inadmissible as having been obtained in violation of Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination). Miranda also indicated what law
enforcement could do to overcome this presumption of coercion: the giving and con-
scientious heeding of a set of four warnings. Id. at 467-72. Although Congress chal-
lenged Miranda by establishing voluntariness as the touchstone of the admissibility of
confessions in federal court, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000), Miranda was recently upheld by
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (holding that Miranda announced a
constitutional decision of the Court that Congress could not supersede by statute).
42. Former New York City Police Officer James J. Fyfe's research made particu-
larly noteworthy progress with respect to the use of deadly force. See, e.g., JEROME H.
SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF
FORCE (1993); James J. Fyfe, Who Shoots?-A Look at Officer, Race and Police Shoot-
ing, 9 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 367 (1981).
43. WALKER, supra note 8, at 38 (citing James J. Fyfe, Administrative Interventions
on Police Shooting Discretion: An Empirical Analysis, 7 J. CRIM. JUST. 309 (1979)).
44. WALKER, supra note 8, at 38.
45. Id. (citing HERVEY A. JURIS & PETER FEUILLE, POLICE UNIONS (1973)).
46. WALKER, supra note 8, at 38.
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hearings.47 These unions, with their new power within the profes-
sion, made police reformers uneasy because unions tended to "re-
sist innovations and [become] particularly hostile to attempts to
improve police-community relations. '4 8
Notwithstanding their growing influence and enormous impact
on police administration, police unions did not fare well in their
battle to avoid the onset of the citizen review process.
E. Citizen Review
Civil rights groups favored citizen review of police actions in or-
der to address concerns "that minority citizens were the victims of
systemic police abuse and that police departments did not investi-
gate complaints or discipline officers. '49
While serving as assistant director of the New York City Police
Department Civilian Complaint Review Board ("CCRB"), I had
the opportunity to witness personally the Patrolmen's Benevolent
Association's ("PBA") opposition to change. I had been ap-
pointed by then Police Commissioner Robert J. McGuire, on the
eve of the first in a series of congressional hearings, examining
charges of police brutality.50 For the next three-and-one-half years,
working as principal deputy to Charles J. Adams, the executive di-
rector, I helped to revise management practices and policies, and
to strengthen the investigations process. We met strong opposition
from the PBA even though we kept its leadership informed of pro-
spective changes in board policy that had an impact on their mem-
bers. On more than one occasion, we prevailed in our efforts to
exercise our management prerogative to implement policies, such
as making available to precinct commanding officers the CCRB
records of certain officers under their command for whom they
were accountable. Although the establishment of citizen oversight
of police practices was slow, it grew steadily through the 1970s and
1980s, and by the 1990s, a citizen review process existed in many of
our big cities.
47. Id.
48. WALKER, supra note 8, at 38.
49. Id. at 39.
50. Representative John Conyers Jr., then chair of the House Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, conducted hearings on police brutality in New York in November
1983. E.g., Sam Roberts, Koch Defends Police at Hearing on Brutality, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 1983, at Al.
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A CRITICAL INNOVATION: THE RISE OF COMMUNITY POLICING
The rise of community-policing strategies in the last two decades
of the twentieth century is the most important and promising new
development in policing for a democratic society. There is little
doubt that by the 1980s, the police profession found itself adrift. It
was still reeling from the cumulative effects of the 1960s: the civil
rights movement; the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy,
Dr. Martin Luther King, and Senator Robert F. Kennedy; riots in
inner-city communities across the country; protests against the Vi-
etnam War; and landmark Supreme Court decisions redefining po-
lice policy and procedures. This period of social upheaval was
followed by the 1970s, during which research findings such as the
Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment51 shattered the long
standing assumption that random police patrols deterred crime.
Policing had become "an occupation in search of a [new]
strategy. 52
By the 1980s, that strategy had arrived in the form of community
policing. The community-policing philosophy is grounded in the
thesis that officers who shed their traditional crime-fighter role,
and work more closely with neighborhood citizens to develop pro-
grams and strategies to solve problems, can more effectively ad-
dress crime and related issues affecting the community. Hence,
community partnership and problem solving took center stage as
the new core strategy.
Solid empirical support for community policing is found in the
seminal article, The Police and Neighborhood Safety: Broken Win-
dows.53 Authors James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling explained
that foot patrol had only limited deterrent effect on crime.54 The
research also suggested that police could not fight crime by them-
selves but were very dependent upon citizens for information.
Furthermore, police could reduce fear by concentrating on less se-
rious quality of life problems. 56 The nearly universal acceptance of
this theory in academia set the stage for police chiefs, elected offi-
51. COMMUNITY POLICING: CLASSICAL READINGS 49 (Willard Oliver, ed. 2000).
52. George L. Kelling, Forward to COMMUNITY POLICING: CLASSICAL READINGS,
at ix (Willard Oliver, ed. 2000).
53. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, The Police and Neighborhood Safety:
Broken Windows, ATLArrIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29-38.
54. Id. at 29.
55. Id. at 34-35 (describing situations in which citizens pass along information
about neighborhood crimes to officers engaged in community policing).
56. Id. at 32-33 (describing the effect of disorder in the streets on the community's
fear of crime).
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cials, and community leaders to act, implementing community po-
licing strategies that appeared to offer meaningful solutions to
endemic problems and concerns that had previously seemed
insurmountable.
From the perspective of police leaders, the "Broken Windows"
rationale is clearly rooted in the lessons of the past quarter century.
Changes in demographics and strains on limited police budgets in
the face of increasing violence and drug use in neighborhoods were
a major inducement for government and citizens alike to share the
responsibility for keeping communities safe. As a driver of change,
community policing shared the spotlight with Herman Goldstein's
concept of "Problem Oriented Policing," which asserts that instead
of treating crime and disorder as general categories, the police
should identify and focus on specific problems such as chronic al-
coholics in the neighborhood, or abandoned buildings that served
as drug houses. 57
A number of police departments around the country embraced
community policing and set about testing various strategies based
on the theory. Each of them adopted the spirit and tenor of the
philosophy, yet explored its own way of assessing problems and
implementing solutions. By the late 1980s, community-based polic-
ing had caught on and was generating a renewed confidence
throughout the profession. George Kelling correctly argued that "a
quiet revolution is reshaping American policing."58 Indeed, a new
era had begun. What Kelling termed a "quiet revolution" soon
counted among its revolutionaries law enforcement officials from
departments in the smallest villages and the largest of big cities. In
addition, the five principal professional police organizations-the
International Association of Chiefs of Police ("IACP"), the Na-
tional Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives ("NO-
BLE"), the National Sheriffs Association ("NSA"), the Police
Executive Research Forum ("PERF"), and the Police Founda-
tion-also saw the potential of community policing.5 9 Even as
many in the policing profession found it difficult to move away
from what had been the traditional reactive crime fighting role,
57. Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach, 25
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 236, 244-47 (1979).
58. George L. Kelling, Police and Communities: The Quiet Revolution, in COMMU-
NITY POLICING 60 (Willard Oliver ed. 1988).
59. The Community Policing Consortium, a partnership of these five organiza-
tions, was created and funded in 1993 by the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of
Justice Assistance ("BJA"). Responsibility for the Consortium was transferred from
BJA to the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services ("COPS") in 1995.
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other, more visionary police leaders saw the opportunity for police
to become more proactive, working in partnership with the com-
munity to find solutions to the underlying causes of crime.
The Community Policing Consortium offered the following per-
spective with respect to the scope of community policing:
Community policing is democracy in action. It requires the ac-
tive participation of local government, civic and business lead-
ers, public and private agencies, residents, churches, schools,
and hospitals. All who share a concern for the welfare of the
neighborhood should bear responsibility for safeguarding that
welfare .... [R]esearch reveal[s] that community institutions are
the first line of defense against disorder and crime .... Thus it is
essential that the police work closely with all facets of the com-
munity to identify concerns and to find the most effective
solutions.6 °
Over the past one hundred years, "American police departments
changed from inefficient and corrupt political enterprises to enter-
prises with a nonpartisan professional mission. ' 61 There have been
significant "improvements in personnel standards and systems of
accountability, including the values of due process and equal pro-
tection" during the last thirty years.62 The experience of the past
decades has produced a vast amount of research about policing and
has promoted a "new candor about police discretion and about the
limits of the police's ability to control crime."'63 There is now no
question that "police [today] are remarkably open to innovation
and experimentation. 64
While these changes were occurring in police departments, a
number of mayors, city managers, and community groups began to
recognize the advantages for community-based collaboration of-
fered by community policing. There are myriad instances in which
the support from one or more of these three groups has validated
the importance of community policing and problem solving in local
neighborhoods. Notable examples include Madison, Wisconsin,
where Police Chief David C. Couper pioneered the restructuring of
his department, placing strong emphasis on organizational change
through leadership and training designed, among other things, to
60. CM-Y. POLICING CONSORTIUM, UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY POLICING: A
FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION, TRACING THE ROOTS OF COMMUNITY POLICING, at http://
www.communitypolicing.org/chap2fw.html.
61. WALKER, supra note 8, at 40.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting DAVID H. BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE FUTURE 101 (1994)).
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emphasize a customer orientation and focus toward citizens;65 San
Diego, California, where Police Chief Bob Burgreen introduced
the problem-oriented approach to policing in the fall of 1989;66 Se-
attle, Washington, where the police chief, supported by the newly
elected mayor, became a partner in support of the South Seattle
Crime Prevention Committee in its efforts to address public safety
and crime related problems; 67 and Portland, Oregon, where Police
Chief Tom Potter and citizen groups prevailed in getting the City
Council to pass resolutions adopting community policing as the
new approach to address the public safety concerns of neighbor-
hoods and businesses.68
By 1992, the climate was right to reinforce the notion that com-
munity policing was a viable option in the attack on serious crime
in the country. Crime was a prominent issue in the presidential
campaign, and if the idea of putting 100,000 additional officers on
the streets had strong appeal, then linking this idea to the commu-
nity-policing philosophy was sure to be a winner among many po-
lice executives and academics interested in policing. Community
groups seeking opportunities to work in partnership with the police
applauded proposed federal legislation to support these ideas.
By the summer of 1994, President Clinton had succeeded in se-
curing the passage of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce-
ment Act of 1994,69 from which the Office of Community Oriented
Policing Services ("COPS") program was born. The COPS pro-
gram had the following goals: (1) increase the number of officers
deployed in American communities, (2) foster problem solving and
interaction with communities by police officers, (3) encourage in-
novation in policing, and (4) develop new technologies for assisting
in reducing crime and its consequences.7 ° This was an ambitious
undertaking, and the authorizing language creating the program
would require the COPS office to accomplish these goals in just six
years, with a budget of $8.8 billion.71 The police were ready and
COPS funding would serve as the catalyst for change.
65. DANIEL E. LUNGREN, CRIME PREVENTION CTR., ATTORNEY GEN'S OFFICE,
CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING & PROBLEM SOLV-
ING 67 (1992).
66. Id. at 77.
67. Id. at 113.
68. Id. at 60.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (1994).
70. Jeffrey A. Roth & Joseph F. Ryan, The COPS Program After 4 Years-Na-
tional Evaluation, RES. IN BRIEF (Nat'l Inst. of Just., Wash., D.C.), Aug. 2000, at 1.
71. "The 1994 Crime Act provided COPS with $8.8 billion and six years to fund
the addition of community oriented policing officers and advance community policing
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LESSONS FROM THE PAST CAN HELP US SURVIVE THE FUTURE
Six years have passed since the COPS office began providing re-
sources to state and local police and sheriffs' departments. Crime
rates have continued to hold at record lows. 72 The number of re-
ported index crimes has declined by 16% nationwide since 1995.73
One of the most visible and dramatic reductions in crime occurred
in New York City. Mayor Giuliani, citing figures from the Mayor's
Management Report for fiscal year 2000, noted that despite its sta-
tus as the nation's largest city, New York ranked 165th in per cap-
ita crime among 217 cities with populations exceeding 100,000. 71
He noted further that crimes in the seven major categories fell
7.8%, continuing a pattern over the last eight years.75
However, although the crime data tell a positive story, one need
only recall the brutal assault on Abner Louima, and the deaths of
Amadou Diallo and Patrick Dorismond, to know that there is
much work to be done. Indeed, as a colleague, Jeremy Travis,
noted in a recent article, "[i]t is the best of times and worst of times
for the New York Police Department. '7 6 Travis underscored the
tenuous state of police-community relations, particularly police-mi-
nority relations, in New York City.77 He offered, for the considera-
tion of city leaders, lessons learned from "innovative studies
tested" across the country on how they might help in addressing
police-community tensions.78 These included: (1) soliciting "the
public's views of police performance through regular, independent
surveys"; (2) "publish[ing] regular independent surveys of police
nationwide." OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 (Sept. 2000).
72. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITES STATES 1998:
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 6 (1999) (reporting that crime rates in 1998 were the low-
est since 1973), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/Cius 98/98crime/98ciusOl.pdf.
73. E.g., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITES STATES 1999:
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 7 fig.2.2 (2000) (showing a decrease in index crimes be-
tween 1995 and 1999 of 16.1%, and a decrease in the rate of index crimes per 100,000
inhabitants of 19.1%), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/Cius-99/99crime/99cius.pdf.
"The Crime Index is composed of selected offenses used to gauge fluctuations in the
overall volume and rate of crime reported to law enforcement" and includes such
offenses as murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery and aggra-
vated assault, and the property crimes of burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft,
and arson. Id.
74. Eric Lipton, Giuliani Gives Status Report With Peaks And Few Dips, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2000, at B9.
75. Id.
76. Jeremy Travis, Policing Police Misconduct: The next NYPD commissioner can
learn from the best new tactics from across the nation, N.Y. POST, Aug. 14, 2000, at 2.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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officers to get a firm sense of officer morale and the pressures of
the job"; (3) and [conducting] "ongoing, independent audits of crit-
ical police functions, including crime reports, enforcement actions
and responses to 911 calls."79
Such suggestions, however, are valuable only to the extent that
the leaders to whom they are directed are willing to acknowledge
that a problem exists, are open to the possibilities for change, and
are genuinely committed to resolution. I have worked with police
chiefs and mayors alike who recognized that police-community
tensions existed in their cities. They were dedicated to finding
common ground and seeking lasting solutions with a view towards
improving police-community relations.
It may sound like a clichd to state that one must lead by exam-
ple. However, in my experience, it is absolutely essential that po-
lice administrators, mayors, and others in leadership roles do
exactly that. It is not enough for leaders to hire more officers, buy
better equipment, or improve technology. Our leaders must show
that they have strong values, ethics, integrity, and respect for and
commitment to all of the people they serve. At the same time, they
must ensure that police officers and civilian workers in the agencies
they lead are aware of the values the administrators hold, and
know that everyone in the organization is expected to live by them.
Those in leadership positions must be sensitive to citizens' con-
cerns as well. They must anticipate potential problems arising from
the use of certain law enforcement strategies and police practices
that may be viewed by segments of the community as having an
adverse impact on them, thus eroding community support for the
police. Leaders must be open to engaging in regular communica-
tion and candid discussions with the community on a regular basis
and, most importantly, during times of crisis.
In his book, Turnaround: How America's Top Cop Reversed the
Crime Epidemic, former New York City Police Commissioner Wil-
liam Bratton, who served during the early Giuliani administration,
observed "[h]ow ironic [it would be] if the police, [who are] per-
ceived in many neighborhoods to be part of the problem, turned
out to be in the forefront of a movement toward understanding and
resolution."80 There is no irony in this statement at all. The police
must take the lead in resolving these conflicts. As Bratton ex-
plains, "American policing can and must be an essential and signifi-
79. Id.
80. WILLIAM BRATrON & PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND: How AMERICA'S Top
Cop REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC 311 (1998).
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cant force in addressing the issues of race and police behavior. '81
But to achieve these goals, "it is essential that police identify and
train new leaders. '8 2 Moreover, the training should reinforce the
notion that those who take the oath to serve have a duty to conduct
themselves as professionals. We need a continuing commitment to
changing both the formal and informal processes that influence the
conduct of our police. I believe that the social contract between
the public and the police requires nothing less.
We remain at a crossroads with respect to police-community re-
lations and, in particular, police-minority relations, in New York
City and elsewhere in this country. Extraordinary leadership and
commitment, especially by police executives and police unions, will
be required to improve relations with communities of color. But
with the support of mayors, city managers, city councils, and others
from the public and private sectors, police departments will be en-
couraged to seek and find solutions. Although we tend to focus on
these issues at times of crisis, the problem is systemic, and it de-
serves focused and interdisciplinary attention from every sector of
our community. We cannot afford to hope that the next crisis or
tragedy resulting from a police-community interaction will happen
in some other city, on some other leader's watch. The fact is that,
while these incidents have geographic boundaries, the media en-
sures that reports of their occurrence reach us everywhere in real
time. This has the effect of making localized crises national crises.
The effect is cumulative, and each new event feeds and reinforces
concerns that police conduct is largely motivated by racial and
other biases, fueling a suspicion that police overreach in the name
of legitimate law enforcement.
In the words of former New York City Police Department chief
of personnel, my colleague and good friend Mike Julian, "We tell
cops not do the wrong thing; we need to show them how to do the
right thing. '83
81. Id. at 312.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 313.
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